

Online Appendix:

Press Coverage and Accountability in State Legislatures

Intended for online publication only.

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A.1 Summary of Prior Research on Press Coverage and Accountability

Table A.1 – Summary of Prior Studies of Press Coverage and Accountability. The table lists prior studies of newspaper coverage and accountability in Congress (Panel A) and state legislatures and municipal governments (Panel B).

| Panel A: | Congress | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|---|--------------------------------|
| Outcome | Snyder and Stromberg (2010) | Arnold (2004), Peterson (2021 <i>a</i>), Hayes and Lawless (2015) | Moskowitz (2021), Filla and Johnson (2010) | Trussler (2021, 22), Prior (2006), Schaffner (2006) | Canes-Wrone and Kistner (2023) |
| Voter knowledge | ✓ | ✓ | | | |
| Ballot rolloff/turnout | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| Incumbency advantage | ✓ | | | ✓ | |
| Electoral returns to moderation | | | | | ✓ |
| Committee activity | ✓ | | | | |
| Witness appearances | ✓ | | | | |
| Missed roll-call votes | | | | | |
| Bill sponsorship | | | | | |
| Voting with party | ✓ | | | | |
| Government spending | ✓ | | | | |
| Ideological representation | ✓ | | | | |
| Panel B: | Municipal Government | | State Legislatures | | |
| Outcome | Rubado and Jennings (2020) | Hopkins and Pettingill (2018), Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido (2013) | Carpini, Keeter, and Kenamer (1994) | Rogers (2017,2023 <i>a</i>) Auslen (2024) | This Manuscript |
| Voter knowledge | | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Ballot rolloff/turnout | ✓ | | | | ✓ |
| Incumbency advantage | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Electoral returns to moderation | | | | | ✓ |
| Committee activity | | | | | ✓ |
| Legislative productivity | | | | | ✓ |
| Witness appearances | | | | | ✓ |
| Missed roll-call votes | | | | | ✓ |
| Bill sponsorship | | | | | ✓ |
| Voting with party | | | | | |
| Government spending | | | | ✓ | |
| Ideological representation | | | | | ✓ |

A.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.2 – Summary Statistics for Control Variables.

| Variable | Mean | Median | Min | Max | Std. Dev. | Data Source |
|--------------------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|
| Freshman | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.4 | SLERs |
| Experience | 4.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 27.0 | 3.3 | SLERs |
| Chair | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.4 | Fourinaies (2018) |
| Close Race | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | Author |
| Uncontested Race | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | SLERs |
| Open Seat | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.4 | SLERs |
| Median Income | 53,451.0 | 51,160.0 | 22,020.0 | 115,458.0 | 12,920.0 | IPUMS |
| Population Density | 1,845.0 | 334.0 | 0.9 | 113,772.0 | 5,144.0 | IPUMS |
| % Urban | 69.0 | 74.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 25.0 | IPUMS |
| % Retired | 15.0 | 15.0 | 5.3 | 45.0 | 3.5 | IPUMS |
| % Veterans | 4.6 | 3.4 | 0.2 | 26.0 | 2.8 | IPUMS |
| % Foreign Born | 7.8 | 5.3 | 0.2 | 53.0 | 7.5 | Census Bureau |

Table A.3 – Summary Statistics for Outcome Variables.

| Variable | Mean | Median | Min | Max | Std. Dev. | Data Source |
|-----------------------------------|------|--------|-------|---------|-----------|-------------------------------------|
| State Legislator Name Recall | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | Rogers (2018) |
| Rated State Legislator | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.4 | CES |
| Knows Majority in U.S. House | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | CES |
| Knows Majority in U.S. Senate | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | CES |
| Knows Majority in State House | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.4 | CES |
| Knows Majority in State Senate | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.4 | CES |
| Roll-off in State Leg. | 4.5 | 4.0 | -15.2 | 12.4 | 4.2 | Author |
| Roll-off in U.S. Senate (Placebo) | 2.1 | 1.4 | -13.8 | 15.0 | 2.8 | Author |
| Dem. Vote Share in t | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.2 | SLERs |
| Dem. Vote Share t+1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.1 | SLERs |
| Percent Floor Votes Missed | 97.0 | 100.0 | 3.1 | 100.0 | 8.2 | LegiScan/Fourinaies and Hall (2022) |
| Number of Bills Sponsored | 26.0 | 14.0 | 0.0 | 2,016.0 | 46.0 | LegiScan/Fourinaies and Hall (2022) |
| Probabilitiy on Power Committee | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | Bucchianeri et al. (2024) |
| NP-Score | 0.1 | 0.3 | -3.0 | 3.4 | 1.0 | Shor and McCarty (2011) |

A.3 Computing Congruence

I compute Congruence using newspaper circulation data within each district, based on observed circulation data at the newspaper-county level. Let x_{mct} be the circulation of paper m in county c in year t . Following Snyder and Stromberg (2010), I assume that the number of copies of newspaper m sold in county c in year t is proportionate across district d . I then impute district-level circulation as $x_{mdt} = \sum_c (\frac{n_{cdt}}{\sum_{d'} n_{cd't}} x_{mct})$, where n_{cdt} is the population of the part of district d in county c in year t .

Drawing on this data, I calculate m 's market share in d as

$$MarketShare_{mdt} = \frac{x_{mdt}}{\sum_{m'} x_{m'dt}}, \quad (1)$$

and m 's share of readers in district d as

$$ReaderShare_{mdt} = \frac{x_{mdt}}{\sum_{d'} x_{md't}}. \quad (2)$$

Intuitively, Market Share represents each newspaper's share of total sales in a given district, while Reader Share captures the share of a newspaper's readership that resides in the district. To Capture congruence, I weight Reader Share by Market Share to account for the probability that coverage reaches a given reader:

$$Congruence_{dt} = \sum_{m=1}^M MarketShare_{mdt} ReaderShare_{mdt}. \quad (3)$$

A.4 Newspaper Corpus Data

To build a comprehensive dataset of observed legislative news coverage, I identify 272 local and regional newspapers on Newspapers.com, representing approximately 20% of all newspapers included in my circulation dataset. Using this text corpus, I estimate $q_{m dt}$ —the number of articles appearing in newspaper m about the legislator representing district d in year t —by searching for the name of the legislator, their state, and the name of their legislative chamber. In total, my sample includes nearly one million articles about state legislators. Table A.4 shows the characteristics of newspapers contained (column two) and not contained (column three) in the archive. Column four of Table A.4 reports the difference between columns two and three and column five reports the standardized mean difference. Overall, the sample of newspapers to which I have full text are highly similar to newspapers not included in the archive.

Table A.4 – Newspaper Text Data Balance Table. This table reports average values for each newspaper attribute broken down by whether I have access to the newspaper’s full text. The *Difference* column reports the difference between columns two and three. Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.

| Attribute | All Newspapers (1) | Newspapers with Full Text Data (2) | Newspapers without Full Text Data (3) | Difference (4) | Standardized Mean Difference (5) |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|--|---|-------------------|--|
| 1 Average Daily Circulation | 59,024 (228,489) | 64,250 (84,592) | 57,794 (250,607) | -5,226 | -0.03 |
| 2 Share Eastern Newspapers | 0.17 (0.38) | 0.16 (0.37) | 0.18 (0.38) | 0.01 | 0.04 |
| 3 Share Midwestern Newspapers | 0.35 (0.48) | 0.33 (0.47) | 0.36 (0.48) | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| 4 Share Southern Newspapers | 0.32 (0.47) | 0.32 (0.47) | 0.32 (0.47) | -0.00 | -0.01 |
| 5 Share Western Newspapers | 0.16 (0.36) | 0.18 (0.39) | 0.15 (0.36) | -0.03 | -0.07 |
| 6 Average Rural Share of Circ. | 0.63 (0.20) | 0.67 (0.19) | 0.62 (0.20) | -0.03 | -0.15 |
| 7 Average Dem. Share of Circ. | 0.08 (0.14) | 0.09 (0.14) | 0.08 (0.14) | -0.00 | -0.03 |
| Number of Newspapers | 1,421 | 272 | 1,149 | - | - |

Note: The *Difference* column may not sum to the difference between columns 1 and 2 due to rounding. Rural share of circulation is calculated using Census Bureau estimates of the share of each legislative district that is rural. Democratic share of circulation is calculated using average district two-party presidential vote share within a redistricting cycle.

A.5 Roll-Call and Bill Sponsorship Data

State legislative roll-call and bill sponsorship data were collected by the author from the online data vendor Legiscan.com and combined with similar data from Fournaies and Hall (2022). This data includes roll-call votes and bill introductions for the near-universe of chamber-years for the years 2012-2022 and roughly half of chamber-years for the years 2000-2011. Approximately 20% of the data originate from Fournaies and Hall (2022) and the remaining 80% were collected by the author from Legiscan.com. Table A.5 reports the full coverage of the roll-call dataset. Coverage of bill-sponsorship data is identical.

Table A.5 – Roll-Call Data Coverage Matrix. This table reports the coverage of my roll-call dataset in terms of states and years. Cells contain the number of roll-call votes observed in thousands.

| State | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| AK | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 13 | 13 | 18 | 13 | 15 | 21 | 22 | 11 | 7 | 17 | 25 |
| AL | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 55 | 122 | 157 | 121 | 101 | 139 | 106 | 105 | 111 | 116 | 49 | 178 | 136 |
| AR | . | 141 | . | 135 | . | 155 | . | 121 | . | 93 | . | 203 | 39 | 220 | 41 | 183 | 40 | 167 | 36 | 163 | 26 | 181 | 33 |
| AZ | 76 | 67 | 57 | 46 | 55 | 59 | 70 | 51 | 55 | 36 | 51 | 68 | 74 | 60 | 64 | 67 | 76 | 65 | 67 | 61 | 49 | 91 | 79 |
| CA | 147 | 137 | 141 | 128 | 132 | 115 | 119 | 118 | 130 | 213 | 187 | 262 | 265 | 254 | 284 | 279 | 296 | 295 | 323 | 321 | 123 | 259 | 315 |
| CO | . | . | . | . | 17 | 6 | 29 | 31 | 28 | 31 | 37 | 46 | 52 | 58 | 49 | 45 | 105 | 87 | 119 | 125 | 90 | 134 | 120 |
| CT | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 12 | 67 | 52 | 82 | 61 | 70 | 89 | 118 | 98 | 120 | 18 | 117 | 91 |
| DE | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 15 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 19 | 9 | 9 | 18 | 20 | 19 | 5 | 22 | 22 |
| FL | . | . | . | 92 | 110 | 95 | 90 | 84 | 82 | 76 | 109 | 112 | 112 | 96 | 87 | 87 | 81 | 69 | 57 | 53 | 53 | 118 | 119 |
| GA | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 171 | 42 | 113 | 168 | 127 | 123 | 126 | 127 | 116 | 123 | 120 | 107 | 126 | 191 |
| HI | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 52 | 27 | 26 | 29 | 42 | 19 | 28 | 26 | 26 | 53 | 42 |
| IA | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 48 | 71 | 64 | 37 | 32 | 100 | 10 | 60 | 28 | 73 | 54 |
| ID | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 42 | 43 | 44 | 43 | 43 | 46 | 43 | 44 | 41 | 44 | 48 | 43 |
| IL | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 232 | 165 | 191 | 134 | 175 | 149 | 161 | 123 | 162 | 158 | 164 | 10 | 203 | 117 |
| IN | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 0 | 89 | 53 | 92 | 83 | 91 | 68 | 83 | 66 | 98 | 60 | 77 | 67 | 67 |
| KS | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 94 | 62 | 53 | 46 | 43 | 44 | 44 | 45 | 31 | 18 | 53 | 38 | 38 |
| KY | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 17 | 37 | 42 | 38 | 82 | 24 | 56 | 49 | 42 | 60 | 66 |
| LA | 55 | 222 | 90 | 208 | 171 | 107 | 163 | 96 | 172 | 112 | 428 | 220 | 364 | 212 | 381 | 246 | 200 | 130 | 203 | 135 | 150 | 153 | 212 |
| MA | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 58 | 45 | 24 | 30 | 19 | 19 |
| MD | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 64 | 202 | 286 | 154 | 215 | 183 | 230 | 254 | 250 | 236 | 200 | 241 | 245 |
| ME | . | . | . | 43 | 43 | 59 | 38 | 34 | 42 | 43 | 21 | 41 | 25 | 85 | 61 | 88 | 39 | 83 | 46 | 60 | 6 | 78 | 32 |
| MI | . | 61 | 89 | 61 | 83 | 67 | 100 | 55 | 100 | 61 | 48 | 101 | 147 | 100 | 149 | 84 | 125 | 84 | 167 | 63 | 100 | 94 | 66 |
| MN | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 51 | 59 | 74 | 60 | 45 | 43 | 49 | 39 | 67 | 32 | 54 | 33 |
| MO | 119 | 118 | 122 | 129 | 105 | 104 | 97 | 102 | 107 | 124 | 94 | 105 | 117 | 150 | 122 | 122 | 145 | 104 | 127 | 109 | 56 | 100 | 84 |
| MS | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 202 | 186 | 185 | 182 | 173 | 168 | 178 | 155 | 148 | 140 | 158 | 134 | 182 |
| MT | . | 459 | . | 453 | . | 471 | . | 423 | . | 169 | . | 307 | . | 276 | . | 289 | . | 272 | . | 298 | . | 324 | . |
| NC | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 2 | 12 | 203 | 65 | 207 | 77 | 170 | 62 | 141 | 65 | 142 | 32 | 96 | 27 |
| ND | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 150 | . | 146 | . | 128 | . | 149 | . | 141 | . |
| NH | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 91 | 104 | 68 | 102 | 69 | 99 | 62 | 101 | 106 | 77 | 92 | 99 | 99 |
| NJ | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 47 | 49 | 46 | 58 | 133 | 116 | 89 | 84 | 100 | 95 | 95 | 104 | 75 | 75 |
| NM | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 20 | 42 | 28 | 51 | 29 | 57 | 29 | 55 | 19 | 30 | 13 | 13 |
| NV | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 39 | 43 | 10 | 44 | 3 | 47 | 2 | 43 | 1 | 34 | 4 | 4 |
| NY | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 30 | 122 | 368 | 82 | 367 | 37 | 241 | 14 | 411 | 342 | 456 | 223 | 373 | 393 |
| OH | . | . | . | . | . | . | 13 | 21 | 20 | 18 | 39 | 39 | 33 | 43 | 21 | 26 | 20 | 27 | 18 | 22 | 26 | 20 | 20 |
| OK | 128 | 130 | 149 | 145 | 159 | 159 | 158 | 140 | 141 | 163 | 169 | 308 | 142 | 300 | 134 | 248 | 121 | 272 | 105 | 289 | 101 | 340 | 157 |
| OR | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | 19 | 18 | 109 | 18 | 104 | 18 | 98 | 12 | 91 | 17 |
| PA | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 166 | 152 | 266 | 247 | 264 | 7 | 324 | 257 | 307 | 260 | 308 | 216 | 186 | 171 |
| RI | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 2 | 52 | 50 | 63 | 91 | 82 | 67 | 62 | 24 | 78 | 75 | 75 |
| SC | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 90 | 58 | 98 | 111 | 100 | 97 | 81 | 95 | 97 | 54 | 90 | 118 |
| SD | . | . | . | 29 | 30 | 28 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 50 | 42 | 47 | 48 | 48 | 47 | 43 | 41 | 70 | 44 | 48 | 48 | 55 |
| TN | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 80 | 73 | 229 | 254 | 213 | 239 | 199 | 243 | 229 | 265 | 284 | 254 | 303 | 333 |
| TX | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 304 | . | 367 | . | 486 | . | 444 | . | 450 | . | . |
| UT | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 22 | 58 | 58 | 95 | 93 | 93 | 90 | 101 | 103 | 105 | 105 | 96 | 98 | 98 |
| VA | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 333 | 326 | 335 | 284 | 301 | 306 | 307 | 319 | 353 | 346 | 556 | 329 | 389 | 389 |
| VT | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 14 | 29 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 17 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 9 |
| WA | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 6 | 2 | 105 | 68 | 98 | 70 | 99 | 73 | 101 | 78 | 106 | 89 | 91 | 86 | 86 |
| WI | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 70 | 25 | 31 | 23 | 26 | 28 | 24 | 20 | 9 | 12 | 21 | 17 | 17 |
| WV | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | 8 | 58 | 67 | 69 | 73 | 87 | 99 | 95 | 83 | 121 | 104 | 111 | 104 | 104 |
| WY | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 10 | 29 | 37 | 45 | 46 | 71 | 55 | 80 | 48 | 46 | 52 | 37 | 34 | 34 |

A.6 Newspaper Market–Legislative District Congruence Robustness Checks

Table A.6 – Newspaper Reader Share and Legislator Press Coverages. After controlling for legislator, election, and district variables, newspaper Reader Share strongly predicts observed press coverage. As a result, the Congruence between newspaper markets and districts is also highly predictive of legislative newspaper coverage.

| | | Count of Articles About Legislator ($q_{m dt}$) | | | | Sales-Weighted Count of Articles About Legislator (q_{dt}) | | | |
|--|--------------------|--|------------------|-----------------|------------------|---|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| | | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Additional Controls { District Controls { Election Controls { Legislator Controls { | Reader Share | 97.79 (5.33) | 111.22 (5.55) | 98.11 (5.16) | 111.09 (5.54) | | | | |
| | Congruence | | | | | 127.63 (2.49) | 89.10 (2.41) | 124.92 (2.43) | 88.97 (2.41) |
| | Freshman | | -3.42 (0.75) | -3.40 (0.76) | -3.40 (0.75) | | -1.82 (0.39) | -1.79 (0.41) | -1.79 (0.39) |
| | Experience | | 0.83 (0.12) | 0.81 (0.12) | 0.82 (0.12) | | 0.15 (0.04) | 0.22 (0.04) | 0.15 (0.04) |
| | Chair | | 0.67 (0.92) | 0.58 (0.93) | 0.60 (0.92) | | 0.62 (0.35) | 0.88 (0.37) | 0.57 (0.35) |
| | Close Race | | -0.13 (0.49) | -0.13 (0.50) | -0.14 (0.50) | | -0.33 (0.26) | -0.34 (0.28) | -0.34 (0.26) |
| | Uncontested Race | | -2.32 (0.39) | -2.24 (0.40) | -2.26 (0.39) | | -1.53 (0.25) | -1.38 (0.26) | -1.49 (0.25) |
| | Open Seat | | -0.25 (0.65) | -0.35 (0.65) | -0.27 (0.65) | | -0.01 (0.38) | 0.28 (0.40) | -0.03 (0.38) |
| | Median Income | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| | Population Density | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| | % Urban | | 0.13 (0.03) | 0.16 (0.04) | 0.13 (0.03) | | 0.14 (0.01) | 0.15 (0.01) | 0.13 (0.01) |
| | % Retired | | -0.12 (0.19) | -0.08 (0.19) | -0.05 (0.18) | | -0.19 (0.04) | -0.11 (0.04) | -0.15 (0.04) |
| | % Veterans | | -0.73 (0.29) | -0.75 (0.29) | -0.75 (0.30) | | -0.12 (0.06) | -0.50 (0.07) | -0.14 (0.06) |
| | % Foreign Born | | 0.17 (0.24) | 0.20 (0.28) | 0.24 (0.25) | | 0.27 (0.03) | 0.11 (0.04) | 0.30 (0.04) |
| | Total Circulation | | 5.41 (0.99) | | 5.43 (0.97) | | 3.73 (0.07) | | 3.73 (0.07) |
| Distance to State Capital | | | | -0.02 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.01) | | | -0.01 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.00) |
| N | | 46,728 | 46,728 | 46,728 | 46,728 | 30,935 | 30,935 | 30,935 | 30,935 |
| Unit of Observation | | District-Paper-Year | | | | District-Year | | | |
| State-Chamber-Year FEs | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Note: Standard errors are clustered by district in parenthesis. The sales-weighted average number of articles about a legislator in district d in time t is $q_{dt} = \sum_{m=1}^M MarketShare_{m dt} \cdot q_{m dt}$. The definition of q_{cdt} is analogous. Results are substantively identical after logging *ReaderShare* and *Congruence*.

A.7 Electoral Selection Robustness Checks

In this section, I conduct two additional robustness checks on the midpoint method (Table 5). First, in Table A.7 I use CFscores from Bonica (2014) to measure Midpoint and Distance. Looking across the columns of Table A.7, I find strong evidence that Congruence increases with the Midpoint estimated using CFscores. In fact, the relative estimated effect of Congruence is substantially larger when using CFscores rather than HMH scores. For example, column two of Table A.7 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in Congruence increases Midpoint by 25%, while the comparable increase using HMH scores in Table 5 is 12%.

Second, while the addition of state-chamber-year fixed effects in Table 5 addresses concerns about omitted variable bias across time or between states and chambers, they do not ameliorate concerns that an observed confounder might be correlated with both Congru-

Table A.7 – Press Coverage and the Advantage of Moderate Candidates in Contested General Elections Using CFscores. This table replicates 5 using CFscores from Bonica (2014) to measure Midpoint and Distance.

| | Dem. Vote Share | | | | |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Midpoint | 0.37 (0.01) | 0.30 (0.02) | 0.30 (0.02) | 0.29 (0.02) | 0.30 (0.02) |
| Midpoint · Congruence | | 0.40 (0.07) | 0.41 (0.07) | 0.33 (0.07) | 0.27 (0.08) |
| Congruence | | -0.19 (0.03) | -0.19 (0.04) | -0.16 (0.04) | -0.14 (0.04) |
| Distance | -0.03 (0.01) | -0.03 (0.01) | -0.03 (0.01) | -0.03 (0.01) | -0.05 (0.02) |
| Distance · Congruence | | | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.02 (0.05) | 0.07 (0.06) |
| Rep. Pres. Vote Share | -0.72 (0.01) | -0.72 (0.01) | -0.72 (0.01) | -0.71 (0.01) | -0.73 (0.01) |
| Rep. Primary Contributions | | | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Dem. Primary Contributions | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| N | 21,740 | 21,740 | 21,740 | 21,740 | 11,383 |
| State-Chamber-Year FEs | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| District, Legislator, and Election Controls | Yes | Yes | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Note: The outcome is either Democratic vote share or a Democratic win indicator. Robust standard errors are clustered by district in parentheses. Midpoint and Distance variables are scaled to run from 0 to 1. The sample is limited to contested general elections in single member districts.

Table A.8 – Press Coverage and the Advantage of Moderate Candidates in Contested General Elections Using District Fixed Effects. This table replicates 5 using district-regime fixed effects to hold the unobserved median constant.

| | Dem. Vote Share | | | | |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Midpoint | 0.17 (0.01) | 0.10 (0.03) | 0.11 (0.03) | 0.11 (0.03) | 0.06 (0.04) |
| Midpoint · Congruence | | 0.25 (0.13) | 0.19 (0.13) | 0.18 (0.13) | 0.23 (0.20) |
| Congruence | | -0.24 (0.08) | -0.10 (0.09) | -0.11 (0.09) | -0.09 (0.13) |
| Distance | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.03) |
| Distance · Congruence | | | -0.28 (0.11) | -0.24 (0.10) | -0.29 (0.15) |
| Rep. Pres. Vote Share | -0.53 (0.02) | 0.27 (0.03) | 0.27 (0.03) | 0.29 (0.03) | 0.33 (0.04) |
| Rep. Primary Contributions | | | | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Dem. Primary Contributions | | | | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| N | 7,986 | 7,986 | 7,986 | 7,986 | 4,475 |
| District FEs | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| District, Legislator, and Election Controls | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Note: The outcome is either Democratic vote share or a Democratic win indicator. Robust standard errors are clustered by district in parentheses. Midpoint and Distance variables are scaled to run from 0 to 1. The sample is limited to contested general elections in single member districts.

ence and Democratic vote share across districts within a given chamber-year. To address this concern, Table A.8 replicates Table 5 after substituting in legislative district-regime fixed effects. This specification focuses on changes in Congruence within the same district across election cycles (but within the same redistricting period), and further mitigates concerns about confounding from district-level characteristics. If anything, the results using this specification are larger than the baseline model, suggesting that the observed effects of Congruence on Democratic vote share are not driven by static, unobserved district-level characteristics. However, because there is less variation in Congruence within a district, these results are estimated with more noise than my baseline specification.

A.8 Productivity Robustness Checks

Since the missed vote and sponsorship rate may be correlated with travel time to the capital, in Table A.9 I add a control for the distance between each district's centroid and the state capital. My results are unchanged following this inclusion.

Table A.9 – Active Newspaper Coverage Increases Legislative Productivity. Active newspaper coverage is associated with fewer missed roll-call votes, more bill sponsorships, and more-active committee membership.

| | Percent of Floor Votes Missed | | Number of Bills Sponsored | | Probability on Power Committee | |
|--|-------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Congruence | -1.57 (0.36) | -1.52 (0.37) | 10.79 (4.09) | 8.00 (3.69) | 0.07 (0.02) | 0.06 (0.02) |
| N | 33,103 | 33,103 | 33,103 | 33,103 | 47,009 | 47,009 |
| Average Outcome | 3.3 | 3.3 | 27 | 27 | .38 | .38 |
| State-Chamber-Year FEs | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| State-Chamber-Year-Party FEs | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| District, Legislator, and Election Controls | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Distance to Capital Control | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Note: Outcomes are reported in column headers. Standard errors are clustered by district in parentheses.

A.9 Non-Parametric Estimates of Multiplicative Interactions

Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2019) show that multiplicative interaction models—including Tables 5, 6, and 8—may yield misleading results if researchers incorrectly assume linearity in effect or common support of the moderating variable (i.e., Congruence). In response, Figure A.1 reports the diagnostic measures proposed by Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2019) and implemented using the R package *Interflex* for every analysis in the main paper that employs a multiplicative interaction term.

Each diagnostic figure below divides the moderator into three bins—representing low, medium, and high values—and estimates the conditional marginal effects of the key independent variable within each bin. This approach relaxes the linear interaction effect assumption, allowing the marginal effects to vary non-linearly across bins, and ensures that the estimated effects rely only on observed data, mitigating extrapolation beyond the support of the independent variable.

Looking at the figures, we observe a strong linear relationship between the binned estimates and the moderator (i.e., the red point estimates are very close to the black line). We also observe strong overlap in the moderator across values of the independent variable. In short, the assumptions of the multiplicative interaction model appear to hold, and after using an alternative setup to explore effect heterogeneity, my results are highly similar.

Figure A.1 – Marginal Effects Plots for Multiplicative Interaction Models Using *Interflex*.

